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THE STATISTICS OF MALAPPORTIONMENT
ARTHUR L. GOLDBERGt
Baker v. Carr:' has unlocked the Federal courthouse door for citizens who
claim their legislative vote is not being counted equally. The effects of this
decision upon the judges inside and the politicians outside have been suggested
earlier. No less important, however, is how the newly admitted citizens will
fare once they cross the threshold. Their reception in the court largely depends
upon facts-they must prove, first, that there is inequality, and, second, that
the inequality is of such proportions as to be unconstitutional.
Unequal Equality
Unquestionably, the vote of some people in every state is being diluted,
while by comparison that of their neighbor's is weighted. In Vermont, for
example, where representatives to the lower house are chosen from towns as
they existed in 1793, one voter in the state's smallest district has 872 votes
compared to his neighbor in Burlington, the state's largest city. The votes of
11.6 per cent of the people can control the house.2 In California, it requires
the votes of 422 citizens of Los Angeles County (population 6,038,771), who
have one state senator, to equal the vote of a citizen of the 28th senatorial
district (population 14,294), which also has one senator.3 These examples,
while extreme, are not isolated, but rather exemplify the pattern of minority
(which today means rural) control of state legislatures. These situations chal-
lenge a fundamentally accepted principle of representative government-that
the majority, not a minority, should govern.
4
This principle, however, even if relaxed to the point at which a majority
of the legislators would be elected from districts containing at least 40 per cent
of the people, would, according to available data, permit only 26 legislative
tLL.B., New York University, 1962; B.B.A., City College of New York, 1959.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. This percentage is found by listing all the districts in order of population and
then adding, from the smallest to largest, until the total includes a bare majority of the
total number of ditricts. For statistical data on legislative apportionment for all states
see Appendix A. The apportionment plan of Vermont's senate was recently declared invalid,
but the court was not asked to rule on the lower house's town-by-town formula. Mikell v.
Rousseau, No. 385, Chittenden County, Supreme Court of Vermont, decided July 20, 1962,
reported in the N.Y. Times, July 21, 1962, p. 44, col. 2 (city ed.).
3. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, REPORT OF THE ASSEMLY INTERIM CoMMrTEE ON ELItC-
TIONS AND REAPPORTIONMENT 76-77 (1959-1961).
4. Any citizen, if asked, would in all probability admit to a sense of outrage at the sug-
gestion that his vote be counted for less in the election of legislative representatives
than the vote of any other citizen. The principle that a vote cast be counted of equal
value to any other is so fundamental to our understanding of democracy as to pass
unchallenged. Yet, in practice, the system of legislative representation in one Amerl-
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houses across the country to qualify.5 Of these 26, only five-Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin-require the election
of a majority of the legislators of both houses by at least 40 per cent of the
people. Forty-seven houses across the nation are controlled by one-third or less
of the voters; and in 12 states this is true of both houses.0 The most extreme
case is Florida, where 12 per cent of the people control both houses. 7 All legis-
lative houses nationally, save only the Missouri and Ohio Senates, have some
districts with more than twice the population of others.
According to a study by Professors David and Eisenberg, as of 1955 Mass-
achusetts, Virginia, and Oregon had the most equally representative legisla-
tures; whereas Delaware, Nevada, and Florida had the least.8 The most strik-
ing information in the David-Eisenberg report, however, is the gradual loss
of voting strength by urban areas to their rural counterparts over the last fifty
years.9 The relative weight of the urban vote in state elections in 1910, as
can state after another shows a tenacious disregard for this rudimentary requirement
of political equality.
LARsoN, REAPPORTIONMENT AN D THE COURTS iii (1962), as quoted in Sims v. Frink, Civ.
No. 1744-N, N.D. Ala. (decided July 21, 1962).
Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 612 (5th Cir. 1959) (Wisdom, J., concurring),
rez.d, 364 U.S. 339 (1960):
[I]n a democratic country nothing is worse than disfranchisement. And there is no
such thing as being just a little bit disfranchised. A free man's right to vote is a full
right to vote or it is no right to vote.
5. Reference is again being made to Appendix A for more expansive presentation of
this data.
6. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Nev.
Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Utah. These statistics do not reflect any changes in the
apportionment and districting laws made in the last few months under court duress.
7. For a detailed discussion of Florida's legislative reapportionment problem see
Governor LeRoy Collins's final report, FLoaImA-Acoss THE THREsHoLD at 34-54 (1960).
.. 8. DAviD & EISENBERG, DEVALUATIoN OF THE URBAN & SUBURBAN VOTE, A STATIS-
TICAL INVESTIGATION OF LoxG-TERm TRENDs m STATE LEGISr.ATr Rm ENTATON. 5,
table 4 (1961). The states are listed in the order of representativeness, as of 1955, with
the figure after each state representing the representativeness of the legislature if all votes
were exactly.equal: Massachusetts (91.0) ; Virginia (87.6) ; Oregon (87.6) ; Wisconsin
(86.4); West Virginia (84.6); Arkansas (84.5); Nebraska (83.8); Kentucky (82.8);
New Hampshire (822) ; South Dakota (79.6) ; Maine (78.8) ; New York (78.0) ; Penn-
sylvania (77.0).; Texas (76.7) ; Indiana (76.3); Illinois (75.4) ; Michigan (74.6); North
Dakota (74.4) ; South Carolina (73.3) ; Missouri (71.1) ; Colorado (70.8) ; North Caro-
lina (70.3) ; Washington (69.3) ; Wyoming (68.7) ; Louisiana (67.9) ; Minnesota (67.5) ;
Mississippi (67.3) ; Utah (65.8) ; Tennessee (63.4) ; Iowa (632) ; Oklahoma (62.9) ; New
Jersey (61.0) ; Idaho (60.6) ; Montana (59.2) ; Vermont (58.3) ; California (56.6) ; Kansas
(56.3) ; New Mexico (66.8) ; Alabama (55.5) ; Georgia (53.2) ; Ohio (49.9) ; Rhode Island
(47.7); Connecticut (46.1); Maryland (43.1); Delaware (42.1); Nevada (41.2); and
Florida (34.9). Figures for Arizona were not available.
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1962, § IV (The News of the Week in Review), p. 10, col. 7.
Graphs show that in 1910, 49 per cent of tha people lived in urban areas, with that figure
increasing .to 69.9 per cent in 1960. The national picture shows a similar anti-urban dis-
crimination. These graphs show that only 42 per cent of the members of the House of Rep-
resentatives are elected by the urban population.
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compared with the "average" vote (100), was 81. This decreased to 76 in
1960, despite an increase in population from 14,853,000 in the fifteen counties
with a population of over 500,000 to some 65,705,000 persons in sixty-four
such counties in 1960. During the same period, the value of a vote in counties
with a population of less than 25,000 (encompassing 27,421,000 people in
1910 and 23,064,000 in 1960) rose from 113 to 171.10 As of March 1959, 31 of
the 97 legislative houses had not been reapportioned in the previous twenty-five
years, despite the tremendous shift in population to the cities, and the increase
in the national population from about 135 million to almost 180 million.11
An even larger decrease in voting power has developed in the newly grown
suburbs. In 1910, 17,154,000 persons lived in the 87 counties of the nation
with a population between 100,000 and 500,000. That number rose to 48,542,-
000 for 238 counties by 1960. Yet the value of the vote for this group de-
creased from 91 in 1910 to 81 in 1960, a drop of over 10 per cent.12
Methods of Statistical Comparisons
It seems clear under Baker that a perfect 1:1 ratio need not be attained to
comply with the constitution:
[T]here is no requirement that any plan have mathematical exactness in
its application. Only where, as here, the total picture reveals uncommen-
10. Cities with the largest drop: Miami, from 91 in 1910 to 16 in 1960; Los Angeles,
from 91 to 54; Dallas, from 92 to 40; Houston, from 91 to 33; and Minneapolis, from 85
to 55.
11. 106 CONG. REc. 14901, 14903 (1960) (remarks of Senator Clark). The National
Municipal League, a non-profit institution studying the problems of state and municipal
governments, has recommended in its Model State Constitution (now under consideration)
the removal of the entire reapportionment process from the legislature to the governor and
a non-partisan board. The members of the board would be appointed by the governor, whose
duty it would be to promulgate a redistricting plan within 90 to 120 days after the board is
named, together with explanations of any variations from the suggested plan of the board,
if they have submitted one. The state supreme court is given- original and exclusive juris-
diction to review the promulgated plan and correct it or, if no plan is promulgated by the
governor, to "make one or more orders establishing such a plan." Article 4, § 4.04. The
standard the League sets for districting of the assembly is population, and senate dis-
tricts are to be composed of three assembly districts to form a compact and contiguous
senate district. See also, Reston, How to Lose Eleetions Without Hall Trying, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 31, 1962, p. 30, col. 3; and Hacker, Message on the State of the States, N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1962, § VI (Magazine), p. 15. For discussions of the political issues involved in
reapportionment, see Krock, Apportionment and '64, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1962, § IV (The
News of the Week in Review), p. 11; N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1962, p. 11, col. 2; N.Y.
Times, April 7, 1962, p. 13, col. 1; Krock, Apportionment Debate, N.Y. Times, April 1,
1962, § IV (The News of the Week in Review), p. 11, col. 1; Reston, And Who Are the
Friends of the G.O.P.?, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1962, p. 38, col. 3.
12. Suburban areas suffering the greatest vote dilution from 1910 to 1960 have been:
New York City-Suffolk and Nassau counties decreased from 113 to 47 and 122 to 59
respectively; Chicago-Lake county went from 107 to 46; Philadelphia-Bucks county
dropped from 148 to 63; Cleveland-Lake county decreased from 114 to 62; Kansas City,
Mo.-Clay county went from 110 to 51, and Denver-Jefferson county dropped from 123
to 41. DAvm & ESisENaG, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8-13, tables 5-7.
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surables of both magnitude and frequency can it be said that there is pres-
ent an invidious discrimination. 3
Something called "invidious discrimination" is bad; apparently some appor-
tionments, even if "discriminatory," are acceptable. 14 The difficult problem,
therefore, is to draw a line between permissible and inpermissible inequality.
The New York Court of Appeals phrased it most succinctly:
We have no trouble whatever in detecting the difference between noon
and midnight, but the exact line of separation between the dusk of eve-
ning and the darkness of advancing night is not so easily drawn.1'
To muster evidence that dusk has passed into darkness is the second great
factual challenge that lies beyond the unlocked doors. Some help, fortunately, is
furnished by the pre-Baker state cases which have attempted to formulate the
distinction between valid and invalid inequality.16 All, however, basically turn
on the selection of some arbitrary figure.
17
The standard most often used by courts is a comparison between the largest
and smallest district, according to population, in relation to each other and
the average or theoretically perfect district.' 8 These cases suggest that when
the standard is equality of population, an apportionment plan resulting in one
district containing more than double the population of another would be in-
valid. The collected state cases show that an almost equal number of legis-
lative apportionment laws resulting in ratios of under two to one, supposedly
apportioned on the basis of population, have been sustained or invalidated,
while virtually every law yielding district with over a two to one ratio has
been declared unconstitutional.
In the Michigan case of Scholle v. Hare,19 for instance, the state's high
court invalidated a constitutional provision apportioning the senate without
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 260 (Clark, J., concurring).
14. judicial standards under the equal protection clause are well developed and familiar,
and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the fourteenth amendment to deter-
mine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply
arbitrary and capricious actiom 369 U.S. at 226.
The traditional test under the Equal Protection Clause has been whether a State
has made "an invidious discrimination," as it does when it selects "a particular race
or nationality for oppressive treatment." ... Universal equality is not the test; there
is room for weighing. As we stated . . . "The prohibition of the Equal Protection
Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination."
Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. Baird v. Board of Supervisors of King's County, 138 N.Y. 95, 113, 33 N.E. 827,
833 (1893).
16. All pre-Baker cases reaching the merits in which the court presented sufficient
statistical data for comparative purposes are collected in Appendix B.
17. For a full discussion of this general problem, see Lewis, Legislat ive Apportionment
and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1958).
18. This has been done in Appendix B.
19. 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.,.2d 63 (1960), reed and remanded, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
On remand, the Michigan court held the state constitutional provisiork districting the state
for the Senate, based somewhat on geography, to be violative of the fourteenth amend-
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regard to population. In discussing just what standards they would find per-
missible, two of the four justices writing for the majority said:
We would conclude, then.., that any law of our State giving some citizens
more than twice the votes of other citizens in either the primary or gen-
eral election would lack constitutional equality so as to void that law,
Here, then ... is a maximal standard by which the legislature and the
constitutional convention [then in session] may receive fair guidance.
When a legislative apportionment provides districts having more than
double the population of others, the constitutional range of discretion is
violated. This is not to say that less than such 2 to 1 ratio is constitu-
tionally good. It is to say only that peril ends and disaster occurs when
that line is crossed. 20
And three Justices of the Supreme Court in their dissent to MacDougall
v. Green said:
None would deny that a state law giving some citizens twice the vote of
other citizens in either the primary or general election would lack that
equality which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
2'
One court has even gone so far as to adopt a frozen, inflexible formula, 22
and another has suggested a ratio commensurate with that created by the
electoral college system.m
In arguing that districts with over a 2 to 1 ratio are not '!invidiously dis-
criminatory," the proponents always state that the variation falls within the
proper range of "reasonable legislative discretion." Such arguments were ad,
vanced in every case noted in appendix B. To deprive some citizens of 50 per
cent or more of his vote is a serious constitutional violation and, while exact
equality is not required, unnecessary inequality cannot be allowed. When a state
is made to defend its apportionment plan in court, unsupported claims of "legis-
lative discretion" should not suffice. The state must show, clearly, that its action
in depriving certain citizens of any constitutional rights was both necessary and
reasonable-that another apportionment plan would not result in appreciably
less disfranchisement while not adding greatly to the inconvenience of the voters.
Other common-law countries have found a non-judicial solution to the prob-
ment. 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962). Motion to stay denied, July 20, 1962. Motion
to stay granted by Mr. Justice Stewart, sub. nor. Beadle v. Scholle, July 27, 1962. See
N.Y. Times, July 28, 1962, p. 9, col. 2.
20. 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350, 355 (1962).
21. 335 U.S. 281, 288 (1948).
22. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has adopted such a formula, but in that.state,
the 23rd Amendment to its Constitution specifically allows the Supreme Court to review
the action of the Board of Apportionment and correct any "errors" it might make. Stevens
v. Faubus, 234 Ark. 826, 354 S.W.2d 707 (1962) ; Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, 220
Ark. i45, 246 S.W.2d 556 (1952) ; Shaw v. Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941).
Cf. Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
23. In Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. S upp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), in which the court struck
down the state's county-unit system, it was suggested that the outer limits of allowable
discrimination against any group of voters not be greater than that in the Electoral College,
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lem of the "rotten-borough" with the size of districts based upon electorate,
not population. Re-districting is carried out periodically by non-partisan com-
missioners. Currently the ratio of the largest English Constituency (with an
electorate of 77,298) to the smallest (electorate of 39,980) is just over 1.9 to
1. Representation, however, is closer to equal proportions. Of the 511 Parlia-
ment seats assigned to England, 410, or 80 per cent, have an electorate with-
in 20 per cent above or below the ideal or perfect district.2 4 In both Scotland
and Wales the ratio of largest to smallest constituencies is 2.6 to 1. Two-
thirds of the Scottish constituencies and 61 per cent of the Welsh districts fall
within the 20 per cent range. The percentage needed to control the Scottish and
Welsh delegations to the English Parliament is 44.0 and 44.8 per cent, re-
spectively. The apportionment of the Australian Federal House of Represen-
tatives is apparently closest to perfect equality. The districting of the six
Australian states is also performed by a non-partisan commission, appointed
by the Federal Legislature. Although the states vary tremendously in popula-
tion, area, and cultural background, the largest district in the 122 member
House has an electorate of 46,549, and the smallest has 30,570, resulting in
a 1.5 to 1 ratio. It takes 48.3 per cent of the population to control the Aus-
tralian House of Representatives.
While the largest to smallest ratio is most frequently used, it does not con-
sider the possibility of a geographically isolated or otherwise special area to
which it might be desirable to give a separate representative despite its low
population.25 At least one court, therefore, has affirmatively expressed a will-
ingness to depart from pure population criteria to provide for a more compli-
cated formula encompassing both population and geography. In Fortner v.
Barnett,26 a Mississippi county chancellor created 49 senate districts composed
24. The English and Australian figures are presented in Appendix C. For a discussion
of the present system of non-partisan reapportionment commissioners (the out-growth of
the Reform Act of 1832 that originally eliminated the "rotten" borough) see N.Y. Times,
April 8, 1962, p. 9, col. 1.
25. Geographical or other non-population factors will be in sharpest issue in Nebraska,
the only state with a unicameral legislature. There is thus not available another legislative
body to be established along geographical or other lines that might be deemed relevant to
stand beside one organized purely upon population.
26. No. 59,965, Chancery Court, First Judicial District, Hinds County, Mississippi,
decided June 7, 1962, reported in the Jackson (Mississippi) Daily News, June 7, 1962, p. 1,
cols. 7-8. The smallest district, as set out in the opinion, contains a population of 20,036
(the twentieth district). This figure was reached by deducting from the population of Hinds
county 177,804, representing four times the average population per senator of 44,451, for
the four senators Hinds county elects. This leaves 9,241 persons unrepresented and, added
to the population of Claiborne county of 10,845, with whom Hinds elects one senator at
large, leaves a total of 20,086 persons to be represented by the Hinds-Claiborne senator.
This is less than one half the required population per senator and violates the standards
the chancellor himself announced he would follow in creating the new senate districts. If
this apparent error is corrected, the next smallest senate district's population is 23,959,
which now makes the largest district (with a population of 59,364) just over the two to
one limit. The population figures are not in the opinion, but were obtained from the Census
Bureau's Advance Reports, Mississippi Final Population Count, PC(A1)-26, Nov. 7, 1960.
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of contiguous counties, but (apparently) with the largest almost three times
the size of the smallest. Of the 49 districts, however, the population of the 25
smallest districts now totals 45.4 per cent of the state's population, as com-
pared to 34.6 per cent before redistricting. The state was also divided into
147 lower house districts, with one representative guaranteed to each county
regardless of its population. The largest district is 6 times the smallest, but
it now takes 43.6 per cent of the people to elect 74 representatives, where 29.1
per cent could do so formerly. This plan was not put into effect at once, but
held in abeyance until November 24, 1962, to give the legislature time to act.
Another departure from a pure population formula exists under Australian
law, which requires that population deviation by any district cannot exceed an
arbitrarily selected figure, 20 per cent above or below the "perfect" district.
Consideration, however, is also given by the commission to community in-
terests, political subdivisions, geography and communications. This accounts
for districts varying in size from 4 to 870,764 square miles.21
Another standard that has been suggested to measure a given apportion-
ment scheme is to compute the average variation from the average district.
This is done by adding all the variations from the "ideal" or perfect 1:1 dis-
trict, above or below it, and then dividing by the number of districts with a
variation. If 10 districts of a 20-district house have a population of 50,000
each, and the other 10 have a population of 150,000 each, for instance, there
would be an average variation of 50,000, or 50 per cent above and below the
ideal district of 100,000. An arbitrary percentage is selected, and any appor-
tionment scheme resulting in an average variation greater than this figure is
declared invalid. In his report of July 31, 1962, a special master appointed by
the Wisconsin federal district court to study the facts in a suit brought to in-
validate the state apportionment law applied this formula to both the existing
laws and those proposed by the plaintiff. He found that the average variation
from the average district in the assembly was 9,125, which is just over 23 per
cent, while the average variation under the proposed plan was only 4,460 or
11 per cent. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, due to the




The rush through the door unlocked by Baker v. Carr of litigants claiming
unequal legislative voting strength has been staggering. Between March 26,
See U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Number of Inhabitants,
Miss. Final Report, PC(1)-26A, table 6.
27. 3 AUSTRAIAN ENcYc. 369-70 (1958).
28. Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civ. No. 3540, W.D. Wis. Ordered, on July 3, 1962, the
appointment of the master. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1962, p. 1, cols. 1-2. For reports of the
master, finding no violation of the constitution, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1962, p. 14, col, 6
and Aug. 6, 1962, p. 16, col. 8.
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when Baker was decided, and the first week of September, 1962, suits were
instituted in at least thirty-one states.2 9 Twelve of the states had not yet de-
cided the cases ;30 in four states determination on the merits was postponed
pending proximate elections or legislative sessions. 31 Courts in eleven states
have held their apportionment schemes invalid; four have been upheld. The
tremendous variance in statistics and legal reasoning running through these
fifteen cases, however, makes identification of a coherent doctrine or numerical
standard next to impossible. Measured by the same yardstick, deviations from
perfect equality have been allowed in one state for example, while compara-
tively smaller variances have been struck down elsewhere.
In the most notable case invalidating a state scheme, the Tennessee federal
district court declared a law passed by the legislature after the Baker re-
mand unconstitutional. 32 Under the invalid law the largest to smallest dis-
trict ratios were about 7 to 1 (senate) and 23 to 1 (house) and the percent-
ages needed to control were 26.9 per cent (senate) and 28.7 (house). A
Georgia federal court invalidated an apportionment law enabling only 22.6 per
cent of the people to control both houses.m3 In Alabama a law giving control
of the lower house to 25.7 per cent of the people and of the upper house to
25.1 per cent was declared invalid and replaced with a plan enabling 42.2 per
cent to control the lower house and 27.4 per cent the upper house. The ratio
under the new system was 5 to 1 for the lower house; 20 to 1 for the upper
29. Fairly complete summaries of these suits are found in N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1962,
p. 23, col. 1, and N.Y. Herald Tribune, July 25, 1962, p. 11, col. 1.
30. Silver v. Jordan, No. 794987, Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, California;
Sincock v. Terry, Civ. No. 2470, D. Del.; Stout v. Hendricks, Civ. No. 1 P 61-C-236, S.D.
Ind.; David v. Synhorst, S.D. Iowa; Combs v. Matthews, Franklin Circuit Court, Ken-
tucky; Hedlund v. Hanson, Civ. Action 4-62, Civ. 122, D. Minn. (Hennepin County, Min-
neapolis, districts only); League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, Civ. No. 551 L, D.
Neb., noted in N.Y. Times, July 21, 1962, p. 19, col 1; Paley v. Sawyer, No. 1593, D. Nev.;
Jackson v. Bodine, N.J. state court; Nolan v. DiSalle, Civ. No. 6082, S.D. Ohio; Mann v.
Davis, Civ. No. 2604, E.D. Va., noted in N.Y. Times, April 10, 1962, p. 29, col. 2; Thig-
pen v. Meyers, Wash. state court.
31. Colorado: Stein v. General Assembly of Colorado, No. 20240, Supreme CL of
Colorado, decided July 9, 1962 (withheld action until after the next legislative session) ;
Lisco v. McNichols, Civ. No. 7501, D. Colo., decided August 10, 1962 (same result as in
Stein), noted in N.Y. Times, August 11, 1962, p. 18, col. 2. Pennsylvania: Butcher v. Tri-
marchi, No. 2431, Equity, No. 151, Commonwealth Docket, Court of Common Pleas,
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, decided June 13, 1962 (judicial review withheld pending
possible legislative action). Wisconsin: Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, supra note 28 (complaint
dismissed on August 14, 1962, without prejudice pending 1962 elections). Wyoming: White-
head v. Gage, Laramie County Court (action withheld until after the 1962 elections).
32. Baker v. Carr, Civ. No. 2724, M.D. Tenn., filed June 22, 1962, reported in N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1962, p. 23, col. 1.
33. Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). In early September the
court in approving the submission of a constitutional amendment to the people, stated that
one house must be based on the population principle, but the other could be established
according to geography. The court expressly analogized to the federal system.
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house.34 Yet a Vermont court 5 declared an apportionment law invalid even
though it required 47 per cent of the people to elect a majority of senators,
since the largest to smallest ratio was 6 to 1. The Tennessee, Alabama, and
Georgia courts held that at least one house must be apportioned directly on
population; an Oklahoma federal court in striking down its law stated that
both houses must be based on "substantial numerical equality."80 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court adopted the approach comparing the largest and small-
est districts in holding a 4 to 1 ratio unconstitutional ;3 a Mississippi chan-
cellor, as earlier noted,38 found its law invalid upon a more complicated
formula. A Michigan court held the state constitutional provision districting
the state for the senate based partially upon geography, unconstitutional,80
while the apportionment laws of North Dakota,
40 Florida,41 and Kansas 4".
were invalidated upon other standards.
34. Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962), and Civ. No. 1744-N, M.D.
Ala., filed July 21, 1962, 30 US.L. WEEK 2512 (1962), reported in N.Y. Times, July 22,
1962, P. 1, col. 2. The court affirmatively redistricted the state itself, in an attempt to break
the "strangle hold" of the minority and thus give the legislature a chance to reapportion
itself. The court announced it would continue to do the apportioning itself until the legis-
lature should act. The statistics noted appear in Appendix D to the court's opinion. Tie
total population of Alabama as found in the appendix is 3,244,386; however this is incor-
rect. The correct 1960 final census count shows a population. of 3,266,740, which is the total
of all the county populations listed in the appendix. This is the first case in which a court
actively redistricted the state effective immediately.
35. Mikell v. Rousseau, No. 385, Chittenden County, Supreme Court of Vermont,
decided July 20, 1962, reported in the N.Y. Times, July 21, 1962, p. 19, col. 1.
36. Moss v. Burkhart, Civ. No. 9130, W.D. Okla., decided August 3, 1962, reported in
N.Y. Times, August 4, 1962, p. 19, col. 3.
37. The attorney general contends, and petitioners concede, that apportionment along
geographical, county, municipal or urban versus rural lines does not necessarily
constitute a denial of equal protection if the rationale of such methods can be Justi-
fied. We are in full accord with such contention, but it is equally true that historical
recourse to such apportionment formulae cannot be justified if it results in invidious
discrimination. The dilution of the vote of a majority of electors to one fourth of
that enjoyed by others is, in our opinion, so unjust as to be invidiously discriminatory.
Sweeney v. Notte, C. Q. No. 643, filed July 24, 1962, at 11-12, reported in N.Y. Times,
July 25, 1962, p. 21, col. 1.
38. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
39. Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962). See note 19 supra.
40. State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, - N.D. -, 113 N.W.2d 679 (1962).
41. Sobel v. Adams, Civ. No. 182-62-M, S.D. Fla.; Swann v. Adams, Civ. No. 186-
62-M, S.D. Fla., decided July 23, 1962 (existing apportionment invalid but remedial action
stayed until August 13 hearing). See N.Y. Times, July 24, 1962, p. 15, col. 4 (city ed,),
The Florida legislature met in special session on, August 1 to consider reapportioning. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 2, 1962, p. 14, col. 6. Florida, as noted earlier, was the least representative
state in the Union (see note 8 mtpra), with 12 per cent of the people controlling both houses
of the state legislature. On Sept. 5, 1962, the Sobel court permitted submission of a con-
stitutional amendment to the people. If passed, it would allow deviation from a strict
population principle in both houses.
42. Harris v. Shanahan, No. 90,476, district court of Shawnee County, decided May
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The picture is no dearer among the four state apportionment laws that thus
far have survived post-Baker litigation. A federal court found the New York
statute valid, for instance, although 36.9 per cent of the population can control
the state senate and 38.2 per cent the assembly; and even though the largest
to smallest ratio is just over 2 to 1 for the senate but 13 to 1 for the assem-
bly.4 ' The law enabling 32.7 per cent of the people to control Idaho's assem-
bly, and creating a 15 to 1 ratio was upheld as within the range of legislative
discretion." The New Hampshire court refused to strike down a law enabling
45.3 per cent to control the senate (at a 2.6 to 1 ratio) and 43.9 per cent the
assembly.45 The Maryland court, following passage of a special statute which
added 19 seats for urban areas to the lower house upheld the districting of
its upper house.
48
Such has been the fate of those who through the end of August 1962 have
accepted Baker v. Carr's invitation to come to court. But, as Mr. Justice Clark
noted in Baker, it is up to the Supreme Court to establish the standards un-
less "equal protection of the laws" is to have a different meaning in each state.
30, and July 26, 1962, noted in N.Y. Times, July 28, 1962, p. 9, col. 3. The court invalidated
the Kansas apportionment laws, enjoined the election officials from proceeding thereunder,
and ordered statewide at-large elections. This apparently is the first instance in which a
court has ordered such at-large elections without statutory authority. The state has appealed
to the Kansas Supreme Court. Letter of William Y. Chalfont, attorney for the plaintiff, to
the author, dated July 31, 1962. In a few cases the court ordered at-large elections upon
specific statutory authority. See, e.g., Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 375 (1932) ; Koenig
v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932) ; Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932) ; Brown v. Saunders,
159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932) ; Tishman v. Sprague, 293 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E.2d 858 (1944).
43. WMACA, Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (ordering the conven-
ing of a three judge court), 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), vacated and remanded,
370 U.S. 190 (1962). The district court on August 17, 1962, held the New York apportion-
ment laws valid. An appeal to the Supreme Court is planned. See 20 Coom Q. WnEnL
REPORT 1416-17 (1962). See also, for background in New York and nationally, Silva,
Apportionment in New York, 30 FoRmDAm L. REv. 581 (1962).
44. Caesar v. Williams, - Idaho -, 371 P.2d 241 (1962). As the Idaho court noted,
the state constitution provides for one representative to each county for its first 17,000
people, and one additional representative for each 3,000 persons over the basic figure. No
county has more than a 17,000 population. As the population of the larger counties grew,
the requirement for the first representative was raised from 2,500 in 1917 to its present
17,000.
45. Levitt v. Attorney General, - N.H. -, 179 A.2d 286 (1962). Rehearing on this
case was denied after the Baker decision. 180 A2d 827.
46. Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County, No. 13,920, Equity, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Maryland, July 23,
1962, as reported in N.Y. Times, July 24, 1962, p. 15, col. 4. The court's opinion is to be
issued later. Rehearing was denied in early September, still without an opinion. For a de-
tailed history of the futility of appeals to the malapportioned Maryland legislature, from
1805 to date, to make a flndamental correction, see Brief for the League of Women Voters
of Maryland as amicus curiae, pp. 2-3, Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX A







State "Ideal" Largest est Control
Ala. 93,278 634,864
Alas. 11,308 57,431
























Neb. (3) 32,822 51,757
Nev. 16,781 127,016






























































































































1. N.A. Not Available.
2. Based on registered voters.
3. Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.
4. Oregon has certain larger combination or "floater" districts.
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STATE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
SEiATE DisTRrcTs LowER HousE Dismxcrs
% Nec- % Nec-
Average essary Average essary
or Smll- to or Small- to
State "Ideal" Largest est Control "Ideal" Largest est Control
Pa. 226,387 553,154 51,793 33.1% 53,902 139,293 4,485 37.7%
RI. 18,684 47,080 486 18.1% 8,594 18,977 486 46.5%
S.C. 51,796 216,382 8,629 23.6% 19,214 29,490 8,629 46.2%
S.D. 19,443 43,287 10,039 38.3% 9,074 16,638 3,531 38.5%
Tenn. 108,093 237,905 39,727 26.9% 36,031 79,301 3,454 28.7%
Texas 309,022 1,243,158 147,454 30.3% 62,864 105,725 33,987 33.6%
Utah 35,625 64,760 9,408 21.3% 13,916 32,380 1,164 33.3%
Vt. 12,996 18,606 2,927 47.0% 1,585 33,155 38 11.6%
Va. 99,174 285,194 51,637 37.7% 39,669 142,597 20,071 36.8%
Wash. 58,229 145,180 20,023 33.9% 28,820 57,648 12,399 35.3%
NV. Va. 58,138 252,925 74,384 46.7% 18,604 252,925 4,391 40.0%
Visc. 119,780 208,343 74,293 45.0% 39,528 87,486 19,651 40.0%
Wyo. 12,225 30,074 3,062 26.9% 5,894 10,024 2,930 35.8%
APPENDIX B
The following are pre-Baker cases in which the apportionment and districting laws of a
state were challenged and the court considered the question on the merits. In each case
the court either invalidated or sustained the law on the ground that the disparity of popu-
lation (or voters, citizens or some other standard) among the several districts was too
wide to admit of a valid exercise of legislative discretion, or that the differences were with-
in a range of valid discretion. The same case may appear twice. In some cases the laws
apportioning both houses of the state legislature were under attack, and the court considered
each separately.
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Other pre-Baker state cases not citing statistics include the following:
State v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916)
Meighen v. Weatherill, 125 Minn. 336, 147 N.NV. 105 (1914)
State v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, 146 S.NV. 40 (1912)
State v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 Pac. 699 (1903)
Even after Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), three lower federal courts prior to
Baker permitted malapportionment suits to reach the merits. They never reached the Su-
preme Court, however. In two cases the legislatures chose to re-apportion rather than risk
the hazards of an appeal. Dyer v. Kazuhise Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii), revd as
nwot, 256-F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1958) (Congress amended the Organic Act of Hawaii after
the district court denied a motion to dismiss) ; and Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901
(D. Minn. 1958) (ordering the convening of a three judge court), 163 F. Supp. 184 (D.
Minn. 1958) (denying a motion to dismiss and setting the case for hearing after the next
legislative session), 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1959) (dismissed as moot). WAMCA, Inc.
v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (ordering the convening of a three judge
court), 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), re'd and remanded, 370 U.S. 190 (1962). The
district court, on August 17, 1962, held that the New York apportionment laws were valid.
An appeal to the Supreme Court is planned.
1. The Supreme Court held that there was no federal statutory requirement of equality
among the populations of the Congressional districts of a state, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment problem was not discussed by the Court; the district court had held that there was
such a requirement and invalidated the State Congressional districting law. See note 5 infra.
2. The only statistics in the opinion are the population of the eleven smallest and largest
senate districts and the twenty smallest and largest representative districts. The population
for the smallest and largest districts are actually the average of the eleven or twenty small-
est or largest districts, and the actual figures would undoubtedly be more extreme. The
court, however, only considered the averages.
3. These statistics are not in the court's opinion, but were given to the author by Mr.
George H. Turner, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in his letter of June 4, 1962.
4. Statistics refer to New York City only. One district had a population of 137,175,
and a neighboring district, with two counties, had a population of 246,187. The court moved
one county (population 66,441) from the second to the first district. The ideal district
population is based on state-wide figures.
5. The court invalidated the law establishing the state's Congressional districts.
6. The court upheld the law which resulted in these statistics, but on the sole ground
that the plaintiffs did not submit an alternative apportionment plan which would yield
smaller population differences. The court noted the "gross disparity" among the districts
and clearly implied that had such a plan been submitted, it would have held the law in-
valid, even though it met the technical requirements of the state statute under which the
county commissioners acted.
7. These statistics do not appear in the opinion, but were taken from 3 Fxrr.TzrH
CENSUS OF THE U=rrz STATES 306-09 (1930), based on the counties named in the opinion.
8. The court said the apportionment was invalid, but declined to act on the ground
that it could find no appropriate remedy.
9. The population of the ideal (or perfect) district was given in the related case of
In re Baird, 142 N.Y. 523, 37 N.E. 619 (1894).
10. Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E2d 160 (1941), overruled the lax
of Moran on the authority of Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). See note 1 .supra.
11. This apportionment was devised and decreed by the court under the authority of
the twenty-third amendment to the Arkansas Constitution.
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APPENDIX C
APPORTIONMENT OF THE ENGLISH AND AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES AS REPORTED IN THE
FIRST PERIODICAL REPORT OF THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND
WALES (1954) AND THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR TASMANIA, SOUTIIERN Aus-
TRALIA, WESTERN AUSTRALIA, QUEENSLAND, VICTORIA AND NEW SOUTH WALES (1955).
Largest Smallest Largest
Ideal or is F % is F % is f %
Smallest Perfect Largest of of of
District District District Smallest Ideal Ideal
Great Britain
England 39,980 56,564 77,298 193.3 70.7 136,7
Scotland 25,311 47,989 66,500 262.7 52.7 138.6
Wales 27,722 50,397 73,049 263.5 55.0 144.9
Northern Ireland is given only 12 seats, which is too small a number to chart.
Australia
New South Wales 38,486 43,482 46,185 120.0 88.5 106.2
Victoria 39,671 42,996 46,594 117.5 92.3 108.4
Queensland 33,906 41,309 46,279 136.5 82.1 112.0
Western Australia 32,159 37,378 40,864 127.1 86.0 109.3
Southern Australia 35,310 41,672 43,852 124.2 84.7 105.2
Tasmania 30,570 34,611 38,749 126.8 88.3 112.0
All States 30,570 42,053 46,594 152.4 72.7 110.8
This excludes the non-voting representative from the Northern Territories and the one
from the Australian Capital Territory.
The Commissioners are currently meeting to reapportion the six states, amidst con-
troversy and charges of favoritism. Sidney (Australia) Morning Herald, July 19, 1962,
p. 1 .
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